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COMMENT
COMPULSORY EUGENIC STERILIZATION:
FOR WHOM DOES BELL TOLL?
INTRODUCTION
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficient.
Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, wellmeaning but without understanding.'
Compulsory sterilization 2 on non-criminal grounds is provided for by
statute in twenty-six states.' In a questionable exercise of the police
power, these states have attempted to prevent the procreation of children by persons with certain enumerated mental disorders or by persons
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
2. "The operation is much more serious in women than in men. In females the surgeon
must do an abdominal operation, removing segments of the fallopian tubes (salpingectomy)
and tying the cut ends. In men the operation is relatively simple. Segments of the vas
dejerens are removed (vasectomy) and the proximal ends of the vas are tied. Neither interferes with the desire for sexual intercourse or with its gratification." Lindman & McIntyre,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 183 (1961).
3. ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 243 (1959). But see In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543,
162 So. 123 (1935). ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-531 (1956); CAL. WEIP. & INSTNS CODE
§ 6624 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-19 (Supp. 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, §§ 5701-5705 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-1301 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-801
(1949); IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-1601 (1964); IOWA CODE § 145.9 (1966); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34, § 2461 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-381-82 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 256.07 (1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 6957 (1942); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 38601-08 (1947); NB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-501-09 (1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174:1
(1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-36 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43a, §§ 341-46 (1961);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 436.070 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-671-80 (1962); S.D. CODE
§§ 30.0501-14 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-1-14 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 3201-04 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 37-231 (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1
(1966); WIS. STAT. § 46.12 (1965). In 1905 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a steriliza-

tion bill "for the prevention of idiocy." See Challener, The Law of Sexual Sterilization in
Pennsylvania, 57 DIcK. L. REV. 298 (1952). The Bill was vetoed by Governor Pennypacker
who returned it with this message:
This Bill has, what may be called with propriety, an attractive title. If idiocy
could be prevented by an Act of Assembly, we may be quite sure that such an act
would have long been passed and approved in this State. . . . The nature of the
operation is not described, but it is such an operation as they shall decide to be
the safest and most effective. It is plain that the safest and most effective methods
of preventing procreation would be to cut off the heads of the inmates, and such
authority is given by the Bill to the staff of scientific experts ....
VETOES BY THE Govgmioa" or BILLS PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE, Session of 1905, p. 26.
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who are not considered capable of properly caring for them for one reason or another. In most states there is a two-stage determination of applicability of the statute. Initially the individual is examined to determine if he is afflicted with one of the enumerated mental disorders: a
pre-requisite to inquiry into the advisability of sterilization. These disorders include the various degrees of mental deficiency, mental illness,
epilepsy and other novel classifications like "moral degenerates." 4
This initial classification is usually followed by limitations on the
authorization of sterilization, based on the appropriate statutory probability that the person subject to the statute will have issue with mental
disorders or who will become wards of the state. This second pre-condition to sterilization varies widely from state to state.5
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS
Despite the fact that close to seventy-thousand persons have been
sterilized,' there are less than twenty-five appellate court cases involving
the validity of a compulsory sterilization statute. The paucity of cases
has been explained away by the Association for Voluntary Sterilization
as due to the careful drafting and application of the statutes.' This explanation taxes credulity. There are other cogent factors that better explain the absence of litigation. A patient requiring continued confinement
in a mental institution may die there after a needless sterilization. A
patient, if he is permitted to be present, may be unable to make a rational defense in the sterilization hearing. In those states where counsel
is provided, the compensation may be limited to as low as twenty-five
dollars." While notice to the guardian or relative may be required, it can
easily be ignored by one who has "forgotten" about his relative in the
mental hospital. The patient or his relative may consent to the operation.
Consent by an incompetent is illusory and consent by a guardian is
4. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14-382 (Supp. 1965).
5. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6624 (West 1966): "When the superintendent of the

state hospital or state home is of the opinion that a patient who is afflicted with or is suffering from any of the conditions specified in this section should be sterilized . . . ." DEL.

CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701 (1953): a three member board determines that "procreation is
inadvisable." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-536B (1956): "by the laws of heredity is the
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted, and that the
inmate may be sexually sterilized without detriment to his or her general health, and that
the general welfare of society will be promoted by the sterilization."
6. This includes a number of sterilizations performed prior to the adoption of the first
compulsory sterilization statute in 1907 (Indiana). Statistics from Human Betterment Association of America, Summary of United States Sterilization Laws 2 (1958).
7. Human Betterment Association of America, Summary of United States Sterilization
Laws 2 (1958). The Association for Voluntary Sterilization, formerly the Human Betterment Association for Voluntary Sterilization, advocates the legality of voluntary sterilization as a means of birth control and as a means of control over the population explosion.
Interested persons may write them at 14 West 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 10018.
8. Nr.- Rxv. STAT. § 83-505 (1943).
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certainly questionable. This is certainly true of a patient's consent where
sterilization is a pre-condition to release from the hospital. If relatives
come forth to protest the sterilization they may have to pay counsel fees
or psychiatrist's fees and many may be unwilling or unable to do it.
Finally, and most important is the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buck v. Bell.9 This case, upholding Virginia's eugenic sterilization statute in 1927, significantly lessened litigation in the state courts.
Bell made the claims of equal protection and substantive due process
violations insubstantial, and the state courts relied almost exclusively on
the Supreme Court opinion, the reasoning of which is not construed or
discussed in the cases. But Bell has withered in the face of new medical
knowledge and expanding concepts of constitutional law.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
If people are to be sterilized against their will, the procedure determining the application of a compulsory sterilization statute must be
fair.'" Partial procedural protections are not enough to satisfy the commands of due process. The protection of the fourteenth amendment attaches to "persons," and does not deteriorate if the person happens to
have a mental disorder. Under the Due Process Clause a person subject
to a sterilization order should receive reasonable notice of the hearing,"
have the right to counsel, retained or appointed;' 2 have an opportunity
to be heard; have the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; and have the right to cross-examine and to offer evidence of his
own. There must be findings adequate to make meaningful any appeal
that is allowed.
All of these procedural safeguards are required in civil and criminal
mental hospital commitments," in application of a post-conviction sentencing act for sex offenders,' 4 and in the application of a recidivist
9. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
10. Procedural fairness, if not all that was originally meant by due process of law,
is at least what it most uncompromisingly requires. . . . Only the untaught layman
or the charlatan lawyer can answer that procedures matter not. Procedural fairness
and regularity are of the indispensible essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws
can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the
choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good
faith by our common law procedures than under our substantive law enforced by
Soviet procedural practices.
Shaughenessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (dissent).
11. Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933); In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash.
2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
12. Lindman & McIntyre, supra note 2 at 190: "The lack of representation by counsel
is undoubtedly a partial explanation for the infrequency of legal contests in the sterilization
area."
13. Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1965).
14. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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statute where an habitual criminal issue is distinct. 15 The finding of fact
that procreation is inadvisable is pertinent only in a sterilization proceeding. Therefore, all requisite procedural requirements are meaningless
unless carried out after the question of sterilization is raised. When a
person is in jeopardy of being deprived of a basic liberty" he should be
entitled to the full protection which due process requires in a normal
criminal case."
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The thrust of non-criminal' 8 sterilization statutes may be either to
prevent procreation by persons with mental disorder because the disorder is hereditary, or because the person is incapable of properly carrying out the obligations of parenthood. The argument in favor of this
latter purpose is that the child born to such a parent will be seriously
handicapped or become a burden on the state's welfare rolls. Sterilization on these grounds in the absence of statute has been upheld in one
state,' 9 while another has rejected an attempt to make the likelihood of
an increase in welfare recipients proper grounds for sterilization. 2° What
criteria may a state use in determining who shall be forbidden from
becoming a parent? "In my twenty years of psychiatric work," one psychiatrist asserts ".

.

. I have seen percentually at least as many 'intelli-

gent' adults unfit to rear their offspring as I have seen such 'feebleminded' adults."'" If sterilization is reserved for the poor because the
children born to them will be welfare recipients then those in poverty
will be put to the "cruel choice" 22 of economic survival or loss of a
constitutional right.23 Furthermore, sterilization on these grounds does
not reckon with the fact that not being born as a welfare recipient is not
a pre-condition to a productive life.
In discussing the constitutionality of sterilization to prevent the procreation of defective children, one starts, as one must, with the case of
Buck v. Bell. 24 Although it has been alleged that the case was collusive,
and that the medical testimony in the trial court was subject to question,2 5 the holding has remained the law for the last forty years:
15. Graham v. State of West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
16. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
17. Cf. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Moroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
18. In addition to punishment, a criminal sterilization statute may also have eugenic
purposes.
19. In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Probate Court 1962).
20. In the Matter of Hernandez, No. 76757 Santa Barbara Superior Ct., June 8, 1966.
21. KANsNx, A MnmATu.z TEXTBOOK OF FEEBLEMINDEDNESS 4 (1949).
22. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (dissent).
23. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
25. Coogan, "Eugenical Sterilization Holds a Jubilee," The Catholic World, April, 1953,
at 44.
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The judgment finds . . . that Carrie Buck "is the probable

potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to
her general health and that her welfare and that of society will
be promoted by her sterilization," . . . [W]e cannot say as a

matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if they exist
they justify the result. We have seen more than once that the
public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives.
It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already
sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often
not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence.26
Bell assumed that the conditions covered in the statute were hereditary. Monolithic scientific opinion on this question has disintegrated.
The Report of the American Bar Foundation on the Rights of the Mentally Ill had the following to say on the subject:
The sterilization of the mentally ill is on even more precarious grounds than the sterilization of the mentally deficient.
Little is known of the organic pathology of the two major mental diseases, schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis.
Since heredity mechanisms by which these diseases may be
transmitted are unknown and the separation of environmental
factors from hereditary factors is most difficult, the American
Neurological Association Commission for the Investigation of
Eugenical Sterilization concluded that compulsory sterilization
could not be advocated."
When considered in the light of recent scientific thinking
the validity of sterilization for eugenic purposes is certainly
open to serious questioning. In evaluating the advisability of
compulsory sterilization it is important to keep in mind that
mental illness and epilepsy have shown an increased response
to medical treatment. It is also important to remember that
though there is some relationship between heredity and mental
deficiency, it has been estimated that about 89 per cent of inheritable mental deficiency is passed on by individuals not
themselves deficient. At the present time there
is no way of as28
certaining who these normal carriers are.
The medical testimony as to the lack of a reasonable basis on which
to bottom eugenic sterilization is legion. 9 The legal comments are over26.
27.
28.
29.

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Lindman & McIntyre, supra note 2 at 186.
Id. at 187. See also Cook, Eugenics or Euthenics, 37 ILL. L. REV. 287 (1943).
Plunkett & Gordon. EPmEmIOLOrY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 28-30 (1960); Sarason &
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whelmingly against any form of compulsory sterilization." Furthermore,
many of our religious sects forbid sterilization on theological grounds."
Many of the statutes provide that the appropriate board must find
that the operation is in the best interest of the patient. The possibility
that the operation itself may have a harmful psychiatric effect should
be weighed along with other factors in determining the reasonableness
of the legislation. The possibility of harm from the operation is significant. 2 This aspect of sterilization makes justification of these statutes
all the more difficult. Sterilization has been said to be a ".

.

. symbol

of the 'reduced' or 'degraded' status of self. In retrospect, sterilization
becomes a permanent mark on the mortification that the patient had to
endure."3 3 Thus, the question of sterilization on eugenic grounds is
". .. also empirical, for if some patients are to be rehabilitated and
returned to the community, the role of sterilization in hindering or facilitating their adjustment in the community must be carefully considered
and analyzed."34
The substantive due process argument then, is that a eugenic sterilization statute is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law since
the attempted exercise of the police power is unreasonable. The "liberty"
Hutt & Gibby,
THE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILD 128-29 (1958); Barrow & Fabing, EPr-rPSY AND THE LAW
50 (rev. ed. 1964); and Weihofen, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMnAL DEFENSE 41-2 (1954).
30. Kalven, A Special Corner of Civil Liberties: A Legal View I, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1223 (1956); Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 Omo STATE
L.J. 591 (1966); O'Hara and Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEo. L.J. 20 (1966). Note,
Compulsory Sterilization of Criminals-Perversion in the Law; Perversion of the Law, 15
SYRACUSE L. REv. 738 (1964); Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.J.
1059 (1965); Kindregan, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three Generations of Imbeciles" and the Constitution of the United States, 43 Cn-KENT L. REV. 123
(1966); Gest, Justice Holmes v. Natural Law, 23 TEmp. L.Q. 306 (1960).
31. Hassett, Freedom and Order before God: A Catholic View, 31 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 1170,
1181 (1956); Rackman, Morality in Medico-Legal Problems: A Jewish View, N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1205, 1210 (1956). See also Pope Pius XI, Casti Conubii: Encyclical Letter on Christian Marriage (1930), PAPAL ENCYCLICALS IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXT 235, 236 (Mentor
ec. 1956).
32. "... . that psychiatric problems follow sterilization procedures is not open to question." Kaltreider, Changing Attitude toward Abortion, Sterilization and Contraception, 62
TEXAS MEDICINE 40, 45 (1966).
33. Sabagh & Edgerton, Sterilized Mental Defectives Look at Eugenic Sterilization, 9
EUGENICS Q. 213, 220 (1962). See also Wolf, Can New Laws Solve the Legal and Psychiatric
Problems of Voluntary Sterilization, 93 J. UROLOGY 402-406 (1965):
The only thorough psychiatric study of male sterilization is that by the Swiss
psychiatrist Hinderer, done in 1947. Hinderer, M., "Uber die Sterilisation des
Mannes und ihre Auswirkungen." Schweiz. Arch. F. Neurol. u. Psychiat., 60:145
(1947). Hinderer's conclusion was that male sterilization was by no means a
harmless operation, and it should always be preceded by a thorough psychiatric
examination ....
34. Sabagh & Edgerton, supra note 33 at 222.
Gladwin PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMs IN MENTAL DEFICIENCY 448 (1958);
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protected by the fourteenth amendment includes the right ".

children." 35

.

. to marry,

Mr. Justice Douglas, in speak-

establish a home and bring up
ing of a criminal sterilization statute said:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power
to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devastating effects .... There is no redemption for the individual

whom this law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a
basic liberty. 6
How can the uncertain relationship between heredity and mental disorder be applied in a particular sterilization case? Since the relationship
is impossible to determine in most instances, a sterilization statute should
be void as an unreasonable exercise of the police power. Since the Supreme Court has not considered the substantive due process issue in a
sterilization statute for forty years, it is necessary to argue by analogy
that such statutes are unconstitutional. The Skinner case described the
right of procreation as a basic liberty. It is difficult to imagine such a
right as not being protected by the same standards due process requires
of other basic rights. Sterilization statutes relying on medical knowledge
four decades old cannot be squared with the "familiar principle, . .
that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."3 7 Is not the deprivation of a basic liberty subject to the rule
that ".

. precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so

closely touching our most precious freedoms?" 3 More than mere recitals
of public policy are necessary to sustain these statutes.39 Despite the fact
that these statutes must be shown necessary4 ° to the accomplishment of
a permissible state policy, none are even rationally related to one. 41 With
the "strict scrutiny" required by Skinner, compulsory sterilization must
fail the test due process requires analogous encroachments to pass.
35. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
36. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). It is also interesting to note that
the opinion cites the report of the American Neurological Association Committee for the
Investigation of Sterilization which concluded that sterilization could not be advocated.
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485. (1965) (concurring opinion).
38. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
39. Cf. Korst, Legislative Facts. in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 TnE SUPT.EM COURT
REviEw 75, 108.
40. Cf. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960): "Where there is a
significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the state may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest that is compelling."
41. Cf. McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 .U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
cruel and unusual punishments. 42 Despite earlier cases holding otherwise," the Supreme Court first "assumed" that the eighth amendment
applied to the states, 4' and subsequently in Robinson v. California
treated that assumption as a holding that it does.45 Thus the Robinson
case 46 now stands for the proposition that the eighth amendment is
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
While all that is said in this section applies to criminal sterilization
statutes,47 the argument is presented that compulsory eugenic sterilization also constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning
of the eighth amendment. Necessary to such a finding would be that
sterilization is cruel and unusual and that it is also a punishment. The
concept of cruel and unusual4" is organic in nature; it is ".

.

. not static.

The amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."4 9
Robinson declared unconstitutional as violative of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments a California criminal statute which the state
court construed to make the status of narcotic addiction a crime. In
dicta significant for the inquiry here, the Court said:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A
State might determine that the general health and welfare require that the victims of these and other human afflictions be
42. U.S. Co~sT. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."
43. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
44. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
45. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
46. See Robinson v. California, 371 U.S. 905 (1962). Petition for rehearing was denied,
three justices dissenting. Robinson had died more than ten months before the Court's decision
in the principal case.
47. Sterilization has been upheld against a cruel and unusual punishment claim in State
v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 P. 668 (1931); Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204
N.W. 140 (1925); In re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P.2d 153 (1933); and State v. Feilen, 70
Wash. 65, 126 P. 75 (1912). Contra, Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 688 (D. Nev. 1918) and
Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
48. "On the few occasions this court has had to consider the meaning of the phrase,
precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn . ...
If the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning apart from the word 'cruel,' however, the
meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different from that which is generally done." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 n. 32 (1958).
49. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary
human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such
a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the
question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the crime
of having a common cold."0
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred, adding:
If addicts can be punished for their addiction, then the insane can also be punished for their insanity. Each has a disease
and each must be treated as a sick person. 5

We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if
and permitted sick
we allowed sickness to be made a crime
52
people to be punished for being sick.
The status of being a drug addict cannot be made a crime since any
punishment would be cruel and unusual. Since mental disorder cannot
be made a crime, the question becomes: "Can a state escape the force
of the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition by simply denominating
its deprivations as eugenic rather than punitive?", 3
Robinson must at least stand for the proposition that a person with
a mental disorder cannot be punished because of his status. "It would be
archaic," the Supreme Court has said, "to limit the definition of 'punishment' to 'retribution.' Punishment serves several purposes; retributive,
rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive. '54 In those states having a
criminal sterilization statute what is punishment to a criminal is regarded
as treatment to a person with a mental disorder. This has caused one
author to comment: "Surely, sterilization as a punishment for habitual
criminals does not become nonpenal simply because it is applied to sick
50. Robinson v. California, 320 U.S. 660, 666-7 (1962).
51. Id. at 674.
52. Id. at 678.
53. Kindregan, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: 'Three Generations of
Imbeciles' and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CHi-KENT L. RFV. 123, 130 (1966);
McWiiams, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: Use and Misuse of the Eighth Amendment,
53 A.BA.J. 451 (1967).
54. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
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people." 5 The critical non sequitur here, however, is that the similarity
of a criminal penalty to an alleged treatment of sickness is not dispositive of the cruel and unusual punishment question. Sick people may be
institutionalized because of their status just as may be done to criminals
because of their crimes. Yet there is no cruel and unusual punishment
in either of these cases. The proper inquiry should be whether the deprivation sought to be imposed on a sick person because of his status is
treatment or a punishment,56 "In the light of contemporary human
knowledge, . . ."" and ".

.

. evolving standards of decency that mark

the progress of a maturing society, ... ,." sterilization on eugenic grounds
cannot be viewed as a treatment, and therefore comes into fatal contact
with the eighth amendment. The concept of treatment in the field of
mental health is, of necessity, amenable to broad discretion. But surely
treatment involves some attempt to help the condition of the patient.
The limit of the power of the State over the bodies of men and women is
overreached when in the guise of treatment it sterilizes to prevent the
procreation of children it cannot know will be disordered, to prevent an
increase in welfare recipients, or when it feels that specific consent is
needed for one to procreate children. Neither legislative declarations
of non-existent medical fact nor utilitarian considerations of the above
nature should be allowed to transmute a constitutional right into nothing
more than a frozen formalism.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
A significant question of denial of equal protection arises in those
states whose statutes only apply to patients in a state institution. While
some cases held this defect a violation of equal protection,5 9 the Supreme
Court decided in the Bell case that the classification did not violate
equal protection. The Court said:
It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point
out shortcomings of this sort. But the answer is that the law
does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a
policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring
within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its
means allow. Of course so far as the operations enable those
55. McWilliams, supra note 53 at 454.
56. State designation is not controlling. "How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection
of labels pasted on them." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958).
57. Robinson v. California, 320 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
58. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
59. Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 930 (1918); Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 Atl. 963 (1913); and In re Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.
Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, Osborne v. Thompson, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y. Supp. 1094
(1918).
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who otherwise must be confined to be returned to the world,
and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will
be more nearly reached.6"
Sixteen years later the same court decided the Skinner case. The
Court reiterated the above language from Bell and after reciting that
sterilization involves the deprivation of a basic liberty said that
"... strict scrutiny of the classification which a state makes in a sterilization law is essential, ....

"'

The Court also pointed out that the "saving

feature ''62 in Bell was the "opening of the asylum to others" argument
of Justice Holmes.
The Holmes view of the equal protection clause has not been sustained in subsequent decisions of the Court. It is no longer the last resort
in constitutional argument. Equal application among the patients of a
state institution does not end inquiry under the equal protection clause.
"The courts must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose ... .3263
The purpose of eugenic sterilization statutes is to prevent what is alleged to be dangerous procreation by certain persons. As between persons inside and outside a state institution, when, if ever, would the
danger be greater from the former? If reasonableness is assumed on
64
the basis that a state has done "as much as it can as fast as it can"
then equal protection inquiry will be effectively precluded. No court is
competent to apply this test of "reasonableness" since the test itself is
unreasonable. To bottom reasonableness here on the capacity of a state's
mental institutions would be to encourage crowded conditions and allow
the protections of the Constitution to be determined by appropriations
of the state legislatures.65 To apply the safeguards of the Constitution
60. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
61. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
62. Id. at 542.
63. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
64. Id. at 194. This language was cited in the State's brief in the case of Nebraska v.
Cavitt, now on appeal in the Supreme Court of Nebraska. Brief for Appellant, p. 26: "The
case before this court is on all fours with Buck v. Bell, which is examined and approved in
Skinner and McLaughlin v. Florida ...." The Nebraska district court held the compulsory
sterilization statute unconstitutional as applied to Gloria Cavitt since there was no finding
by the Board of Examiners of Mentally Deficient that the mental deficiency of the person
to be sterilized was hereditary; since the statute did not provide for adequate compensation
of the guardian ($25.00); since the statute did not provide for release from the hospital
after sterilization; since the term "mentally deficient" was not defined (four of the experts
produced by the State did not agree on what the term meant) thus making the statute
vague, uncertain, and indefinite; and since the statute violates the constitutional inhibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment. Both parties have indicated they will appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.
65. The entire purpose of the enactment seems to be to save expense to future
generations in the operation of eleemosynary institutions . . . ; the theory being
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on a cost-plus basis is to make
its protections nothing more than "... a
66
formula of empty words.)

While no suggestion is made here that the statutes are being applied
in a discriminatory fashion among those determined to be within its
scope, the danger of such an application is real and the proof of it is
difficult.6 7 Discrimination on racial, political, or personal grounds is
found in many areas of our society. Although a discriminatory application would be unconstitutional here, one wonders how many non-eugenic
sterilizations have taken place in spite of the constitutional ban. 8
CONCLUSION
These attempts by states to cure or prevent mental disorder by eugenic
sterilization suffer from many constitutional infirmities. The omnibus
generality of Bell ".

.

. leaves wide open the standard of responsibility"6 9

for those who must apply the statutes. The odious forfeiture of a precious
freedom should not be allowed merely because, as yet, we have no other
answer to the myriad questions presented by a mental health problem.
As a matter of constitutional law, we can afford to wait.
Patrick J. McKinley
that if the Board of Examiners should conclude that every feeble-minded inmate
of a public institution should be operated upon, . . . , then the state would be
justified in turning all the people of this class at large to find their own way, trusting that they, in accordance with the theory of the law, could no longer procreate;
the state being thus relieved of their care during their lives and freed from the
danger of the burden in the future of their abnormal offspring . . . . It seems clear
that Frank Osborn is not given the equal protection of the laws, having in mind
many others situated as he is who are not within the walls of a public institution,
to which equal protection he is entitled with them.
In re Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 34, 169 N.Y. Supp. 638, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
66. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942).
67. Cf. Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 53, 88 Atl. 963, 966 (1913): "There
are other things besides physical or mental diseases that may render persons undesirable
citizens, or might do so in the opinion of a majority of a prevailing Legislature. Racial
differences, for instance, might afford a basis for such an opinion in communities where
that question is unfortunately a permanent and paramount issue."
68. See Meltsner, Equality and Health, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 22 (1966).
69. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).

